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31. The Social Shaping Perspective Specified: The Meaning of Culture in the
Technological Development and its Implications for Technology Policy1
Traditional discourses on technology gave little attention to culture and the specificity of
social institutions: the long-standing and prevalent technological determinist view as a case
in point. This was associated with a technocratic type of technology policy. Similarly, later
economic analyses of technological development focussed on rational choices between
different technologies, on the return of investments in R&D and on the impact of
technological change on economic growth and the wealth of nations (see e.g. Freeman and
Soete 1993). Universal criteria of efficiency were imputed. This led to the 
	 
		: all firms follow the best practice of the champion in a technological
field, and all nations reorganise their innovation system in line with the winner in the
international technological competition.
However differences of cultures and social institutions have significant consequences,
too. The cultural diversity of technical practices, the cross-breeding of different engineering
traditions and the mix of regional techno-regimes may become the unexpected source of
start-ups of innovative firms, emerging technological fields and new networks of
innovation. The cultural shaping view which is presented in this paper emphasizes the role
of different symbolic orientations, patterns of practices and institutional regimes in the
process of technological development. It opens the space and offers the tools for a new kind
of technology policy that I call the 
	  		. This involves a variety of
projects and programmes; it includes a diversity of collective actors; and it takes advantage
of different local and institutional conditions.
The cultural shaping approach extends and specifies the broad body of knowledge that is
collected under the label of social shaping or social construction of technology. It is one
aim of this paper to extend this focus towards institutional uncertainty and towards the
processes of cultivating new technologies (see Russell and Williams, Chapter 3 in this
volume). The  
 of technology is now a widely accepted perspective (see
Cronberg and Sørensen 1996). It is a well-established research strand in technology studies
to analyze how social relations affect the precise design characteristics of particular
technologies, how they influence the choice between alternative paths of technical
development, and how they are fostering or inhibiting particular technologies (MacKenzie
and Wajcman 1985: 24).
The shaping of technologies, however, cannot be conceived as a single closure process
and a local deliberate decision that takes place during the design phase and outside
institutionalized spheres (see Pinch and Bijker 1987; Kline and Pinch 1994; Bijker 1995).
Social constructivism has been criticized for neglecting the multi-stage character of
technical development and overlooking the constraints of established social structures (see
Russell 1986; Vergragt 1988; Rosen 1993; Hård 1993). The development of technologies
should better be conceived as a continuous process of creative variation, taking place in and
                                                          
1 This paper is the result of many discussions in the Social Science Research Management Commitee COST
A4 “The Social Shaping of Technologies” of the European Commission. I thank Robin Williams
(Edinburgh) and Knut H. Sörensen (Trondheim) who helped me considerably to revise earlier drafts.
4between various technology projects, enacted by different social actors, closed and re-
opened by negotiations in multiple arenas of conflict and selected by some institutional
filters (Rammert 1997).
We summarize the debate about the shortcomings of social constructivism and say more
precisely what the term 
 in our concept of cultural shapingmeans:
a) There are multiple influences on the technological development, not a single one.
b) Shaping involves two-way interaction, not a one-way process of determination.
c) It is a kind of “heterogeneous engineering” (Law 1987) or “extended translation”
(Callon 1993; 1995), not a homogeneous representation of a social form in the technical
medium.
d) It is situated in particular “time-space zones” (Giddens 1987: 148); it is not a universal
act.
e) There are plenty of critical events (Van den Ven and Garud 1994) during the whole
technological development process, from inception to use; there is not a single point of
decision or a limited time for closure.
If the shaping process is defined in this way, it opens up the door for a combined cultural
and institutional approach of shaping technology. The 		 itself suffers from
too much interpretative flexibility. One can define culture as a special sphere of values and
norms or even as a particular system besides economy, politics, or technology, as Talcott
Parsons did and many sociological followers are still doing. One can define culture as the
ensemble of all ideas, artefacts and practices which are highly valued in a society and draw
a distinction towards profane culture or simple civilization. But in this context of shaping
technologies I shall follow the broad anthropological perspective and define 	 as a
special “frame” (Geertz 1983: 21) or mode,
• how things are viewed differently,
• how things are done differently, and
• how these activities are institutionally arranged differently.
Consequently, culture is opposed not to economy or politics, but to certain abstract and
formalized concepts of them. This concept of culture contains a particular comparative
perspective which emphasizes empirical practices and which deconstructs the myths of
universality. Thus, culture does not imply highbrow and idealism, but is rooted in everyday
life and pragmatism. This notion of culture encompasses three elements:
• configurations of valued signs and symbols (semantic aspect),
• patterns of practices (pragmatic aspect), and
• regimes and styles: how something is instituted (syntactic or institutional aspect).
Cultural orientations are rooted in processes of signification and semantic framing of action
and perception. They are condensed into visions, paradigms, cultural models or directing
metaphors. Patterns of practice rise in the processes of pragmatic structuring of action.
They crystallize into dominant habits and different styles of activities. Institutional regimes
5grow out of processes of syntactic regulation of action. They gain durability as national
traditions and established arenas of negotiation. In a certain way, this conception of culture
is paralleled by the Cultural Studies approach. This approach is well-known for its studies
of the production and consumption of cultural artefacts in the field of media and mass
communication. But it also concentrates on processes of “meaning-making” and on “social
practices” (du Gay et al. 1997: 11).
If culture is defined in this way, it can be demonstrated that cultural patterns are shaping
the development of technologies more intensely and more frequently than we usually
assume. I shall argue in the first part 		 	 	 
  	 
 
							
	
						
The subject of the cultural shaping approach is the distributed process of innovative
actions encompassing all kinds of actors and practices: technological, economic, political,
and cultural. When we examine the political implications of this framework, it is evident
that the scope and scale of conventional technology policy must be changed. I shall show
below 						
	
	
		

    	  
	   
   		 
		 	
  	 
 		 	  	  			
			
	
Both parts of the paper are connected by the central argument 				

	
	
			
2. How to Cope with the Circle of Uncertainty: The Shift from a Techno-
Economic to an Institutionalist-Cultural View
The idea of economic shaping of technologies reaches far back in the tradition of the Social
Sciences. Karl Marx and Max Weber unanimously believed that economic criteria finally
determine the rate and direction of technical change. However examining the two main
strands of economic theorizing about technological development indicates a slight shift
from a techno-economic to an institutionalist-cultural view: the neo-classical approach of
rational choice and the evolutionary approach of routines and technological regimes.
The adherents of the neo-classical style of reasoning dissolve technological development
into many technological choices. These choices are conceived as rational decisions between
substitutable goods. This type of techno-economic reasoning has been widely criticized for
its empirical improbability and theoretical inconsistency. Herbert Simon demonstrated that
only “bounded rationality” can be achieved and that strategies of “satisficing” can be
realistically expected. Kenneth Arrow (1962) emphazised the critical role of “uncertainty”
and argued that an economic calculus cannot be applied to processes of decision-making in
the cases of invention, research and development. The neo-classical approach to Economics
fails to explain technical change, because it has developed an “over-rationalized”
conception of economic action.
The proponents of an evolutionary approach to the economic shaping of technologies
have learnt from the shortcomings of the techno-economic view. They emphasize local
6variations from routine behaviour and the selective retention of technological paradigms
and regimes (see Nelson and Winter 1982). They argue that organisational “routines of
decisions” and technological “rules of thumb” characterize the firms’ innovative behaviour
more than “rational choices”. The normative concept of a market equilibrium is replaced by
a more empirical and broader perspective of “selective environments” that includes market
relations, state regulations, and socio-cultural preferences. The emergence of the new is
explained by the unconscious modification of search routines and the unplanned confluence
of different R&D strands. The success of a new technology is derived from its adaptability
to the selective institutional environments, not from an universal technological superiority.
The new technologies and relevant social institutions influence one another in a kind of co-
evolution. In this way the techno-institutional interdependency stabilizes into a new
technological regime (see Dosi 1982; Nelson 1994).
This Nelson-Winter-Dosi model of technical change can be criticized for the
deterministic overtones in the concept of technological trajectories and technological
regimes (see Rip and van den Belt 1987), for the neglect of the actors’ capacities to
intervene, and, moreover, for the neglect of their capabilities for creative and reflective
action. The evolutionary approach to the economics of technical change shows some
weaknesses, because it is based on an “under-rationalized” concept of innovative action.
But this approach introduces the notion of institutional environments and non-rational
orientations into economic reasoning and thereby paves the way for an institutionalist-
cultural view.  
					
			
			

Both concepts of economic shaping have difficulties in coping with the central
problematics of innovation. Any really new technology is fundamentally uncertain in many
aspects. Any firm which decides to invest in, and any government agency which wants to
foster the development of, a new technology can neither rely on sound economic
calculation nor upon stable technological prospects. This eminently uncertain character of
new technologies at the outset constitutes a sequence of problems that I call 	
		(Rammert 1999). This circle consists of a wide range of uncertainties which
are mutually intertwined in many ways. If an actor wants to develop a new technology or if
s/he decides to follow one path of innovation, s/he is confronted with a great number of
uncertainties,
• whether s/he gets access to the information about this technology,
• whether s/he is able to select the relevant information out of the flood of information,
• whether s/he has the capacity to process and to convert it into useful knowledge,
• whether the innovation comes up with a feasible technical product,
• whether this product can be produced economically,
• whether a new market can be established,
• whether the users accept the product and tolerate its unintended consequences,
• whether the developer gets a fair return to his/her investments and risks,
• whether his/her property rights are sufficiently protected, and
• whether the product meets the compatibility requirements of technical standards and
legal norms.
7As we conceive technological development as a heterogeneous and distributed process,
where decisions, actors, aspects and artefacts are dispersed over time and space, we have to
take into account a multiplication of uncertainties. If the complexity of the innovative
situation is increased in such a way that economic techniques of calculation cannot be
applied any longer, then cultural patterns of orientation and experience-based practices are
substituted for economic accounting.
Three kinds of cultural patterns can be distinguished in this techno-economic context.
First, visions and technological paradigms can be seen as cultural orientation complexes:
sets of ideas that help orient and co-ordinate technological development, if its complexity
and its openness cannot be reduced by other “rational” means. Second, building routines
out of experimental inquiry, learning by doing, and recursive learning can be described as
another cultural pattern of practice to handle the insecurity of unknown situations. Third,
the cultural orientation complexes and patterns of practice are embedded in institutional
regimes with longer duration and wider expansion. Paradigms of technological solutions
pave the way towards stable paths of technological development; the mutual adaptation of
technological construction and institution-building crystallize into particular regimes of
innovation. Practices that are experimentally produced and that because of successful
experiences are often reproduced turn into traditions and particular patterns of institutional
arrangements.
!	 		 	 	 
		  
	  			 
		
	
				
	
		 The territories of high technology development and the periods of
early technology generation constitute these particular uncertain and complex zones. A
sensitive and sustainable technology policy should concentrate on these early times of the
technological development when the conception and design of new technologies are pre-
shaped, because the variety of technological alternatives is rich, and the paths of
development are still open.
3. Technology Projects and Innovation Regimes: The Cultural Construction of
the Design and the Institutional Shaping of the Technological Development
New technologies do not arise as hard artefacts and finished systems, although they are
often presented to us in this way. They are part of a broad stream of conceptual variation
and experimental design - as many historical studies about the shaping of technologies have
demonstrated. Controversies about technological superiority and quarrels about the safety
of a technical design indicate the inherent openness and contingency of technical
development. They can only be limited by institutional closure and cultural consensus
mechanisms. Economic criteria or technological parameters are not effective at this early
stage of development, because they are dependent variables rather than fixed points of
reference. Any technical construction must to this extent be seen as a cultural construction,
because the choice, the evaluation and the configuration of technical elements are shaped
by cultural patterns.
8Particular 	 
"	 are the concrete places where the general interaction
between these cultural patterns and technological potentialities are organised. These
technology projects restrict the openness and the contingency of technical development,
because promoters follow particular visions of use, because engineers choose certain
concepts, and because firms establish different traditions of design.
According to traditional concepts, technologies are supposed to be shaped foremost by
parameters of technological perfection and criteria of economic efficiency. But with new
technologies, who knows what it means to be "better"? Better under which aspects? Better
for how long and in which place? And better in comparison to which alternative? With our
two-way interaction view of shaping in mind, technological parameters can be seen as
cultural artefacts. They are the products of cultural evaluation and social negotiation
processes. The features of a new technology are, besides other factors, mainly dependent on
three cultural forces:
• first, on the   	  , including an orientation by paradigms, an
interpretation of the function and an image of the prospected user, which align the
further technical development,
• second, on the 
		, which grow out of different academic,
professional and organisational cultures and which are inscribed in the technical design,
and
• third, on 		  , which reflect the particular attitudes and established
relations between the actors in the field and which stabilize the way how the
development of technologies is institutionalized.
# 	 
  	 	 
  
   	
		
	
					
$	 open up new options and paths of technological development
and at the same time limit the wide range of other possibilities. Visions bundle
heterogeneous elements within an integrating perspective (see Dierkes, Hoffmann and Marz
1999). The closer we move to the inception and generation stage of new technologies, the
circle of uncertainty increases and the variety of possible projects increases. Visions of how
to use a device and for what purpose give a first orientation to technical development. For
instance, the idea substituting programmable machine for the disciplined operations of
human computers (Turing 1937; Heintz 1995) pointed the way to hardware and software
development in computer technology. The vision of computers as "augmented knowledge
workshops" (Engelbart 1962) and as "personal dynamic media" (see Kay and Goldberg
1988; Mambrey and Tepper 1992) later diverted computer development from big
calculating machines to the new trajectory of small personal computers. Examples indicate
that c		
			%.
!
	  	   are parts of design cultures. They are based on
engineering routines and standard solutions. They give more concrete orientation than
visions. They determine the particular design of a technical system, for instance whether
you can interact with the computer via keyboard, natural language or screen contact. The
design depends on the user model that designers have in their heads. The conceptualization
of machines, programs or networks shapes the frames of social relations. For instance, once
9a design concept is chosen, it is inscribed into the techno-structure. This fixes who does the
work, the bank or the client; who may intervene, the manager or the employee; who gets
access to the relevant data, the administration or the citizen. # 
  

	

				
				
What seems to be the result of an explicit rational technological or economic decision,
can sometimes be revealed as routine-based and an inherent feature of engineering culture,
such as implicit models, hidden curricula, or 		 of engineering. Engineers often
stick to their proven concepts, to their learnt styles of engineering and to the established
state of the art, even if they are designing new technologies. In following routines and
tested traditions they want to minimize uncertainties and to keep away the risk of non-
functioning. Besides the “technological momentum“ of large technological systems
(Hughes 1982) and the “irreversibility“ of complex networks (Callon 1993), this structural
conservatism of the engineering culture (Knie 1989) is an important factor, which can
explain why new visions quickly lose their variety-enforcing power and why different
conceptual options are constricted to traditional lines of development.
The telephone, for instance, was in the beginning seen as a one-way media like the
established telegraph. Following this one-way transport concept German
telecommunication engineers designed the telephone in the first years as a local device for
the prolongation of the telegraphy system. Hungarian engineers experimented with a one-
to-many communication concept and pre-structured the star-like pattern of radio mass
communication. The vision of a two-way media only became dominant some years after the
patent application and led to the well-known network-like architecture of the telephone
system (Rammert 1993).
The development of computer technology offers another example. Although the visions
of a "universal machine", of a "personal tool", and of a "media of communication" existed -
remember Turing`s vision of an intelligent machinery (Turing 1950) and other early
inventors like Vannevar Bush, Douglas Englebart, Carl Adam Petri and Allan McKay -, for
a long time computers were built and improved according to a single technological
tradition. It was dominated by the paradigm of the calculating machine. The development
aimed at the design of supercomputers for central and faster calculations (MacKenzie
1991). The computer engineers continued to improve the speed, the reliability centralising
of technical system; but they did not search for alternative uses and different designs.
Military influence and the conservative engineering style were responsible for this "natural
trajectory" in computer development from the forties up to the sixties of the last century.
Technologies cannot be separated from the techno-structure of which they are a part. A
machine, for instance, is coupled with other machines to function as a production system; a
machine is integrated in a whole system of technical infrastructure which provides for the
necessary energy, material, and information; the whole technical system is associated with
many social institutions, like organisations and legal norms, which constitute the socio-
technical complex to fulfil a social function. But functions are defined in a cultural context,
and the corresponding institutions grow along historically chosen pathways. These socio-
technical complexes or large technological systems are shaped by national traditions and
particular institutional frameworks (see Hughes 1983; Mayntz and Hughes 1988; Mayntz
and Schneider 1988; Kubicek, Dutton and Williams 1997). They are not the same all over
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the world and they are not organised like functionally specialized systems. The features and
the arrangement of institutions constitute different 	
The American Fordist regime of car mass-production differs from the Japanese Toyota
regime of intelligent and flexible production. In Germany, one can observe a high quality
incremental innovation regime in the machine tool and chemical industries which is suited
to developing complex goods and which needs long term trust relations between the
developers and the users of new technologies. In the USA and Great Britain, the
institutional framework favours radical innovation in biotechnology and microelectronics
(compared to the co-operation and regulation culture as in Germany. Here, risk-taking and
strong competition are rewarded even in the higher education system (see Soskice 1996;
Hage and Hollingsworth 2000).
We have seen that the cultural construction of technologies can sometimes be more
crucial to economic success and social diffusion than technical improvement alone. Real
new-to-the-world-technologies bring up a lot of uncertainties, concerning the choice of
technical parameters, the test of adequate functioning, envisaged user groups, and the
commercial pay off. This circle of uncertainty is interrupted by cultural concepts which
guide the technical development by implicit paradigms and explicit visions. It is reduced by
routines and rules that build the institutional framework and embed technical development
in society (see the contributions in Dierkes and Hoffmann 1992). 		 	
	
	

		
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	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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		
The policy implications of this insight are evident. It is at these early times of
construction and development that a vivid debate about possible different visions should be
initiated. The greater the variety of ideas and concepts of design and use that can be
mobilized in the early technology generation stages, the greater are the opportunities to find
a creative and socially acceptable path of technological development in the long run. An
evolution of technology whose characteristics are not made explicit and whose
consequences are not debated easily runs into irreversibility (see Callon 1993) and risks
getting locked-in (see Arthur 1988) in later times. Further, it is not wise to apply
established technological parameters and economic criteria to radically new technologies.
Innovations need different criteria of testing and evaluation. This paradoxical relation
requires a politically mediated process of experimental projects and experience-seeking in
protected places. The development of solar technologies, windmills or electric cars should
therefore be developed in such “niches” of evolution (see Rip and Schot in this volume;
Hård and Knie 1994). The institutions that are built up in close cooperation with established
technologies must also be reshaped to give room for a new co-evolution of technologies-in-
action and institutional regime-building. New technologies need new markets and new
forms of work and organisation. And they need new tools and a new kind of technology
policy, that caters for its uncertain, open and distributed character.
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4. Multiple Policy Arenas and Local User Cultures: The Public and Private
Construction of Technical Practices
The development of new technologies does not end with their production, but continues
during the diffusion and use of new technical devices, too. And so does the cultural shaping
of technology via recursive learning processes between developers and users.
How do new technologies disseminate into private households? An engineer of the
development department would answer that new devices convinced people because of their
technical efficiency. A business economist would emphasize that they were selling goods
with a reasonable price. These conditions of diffusion are not sufficient. The users also
must make out a meaning and recognize the usefulness of a device. They must be able to
appropriate it and to fit it into their everyday life routines without problems. Even more,
new technologies must offer playgrounds to experiment and invent new uses. The Sony
walkman, for instance, was designed to be used by young people or professional musicians
only listening to the music of their choice when they are not at home. But after a short time,
people of all ages and professions invented a diversity of uses indifferent places which later
on influenced the design that became more and more distinctive (du Guy et al. 1997).
The meaning and usefulness of a new technology are not self-evident. The visions of the
inventors, the concepts of the engineers, and the images of the salesmen are only proposals
for a sensible use of the new technical artefacts, though they have pre-structured the
production of prototypes. From the outset on, there is experimentation on possible uses and
negotiation about the reasonable use of a new technology. Within the firm since no-one
knows what the user really wants, the different departments are in competition to configure
the user (see Woolgar 1992 and Akrich 1995).
Many collective actors participate in this process wherein the meaning and reasonable
use of a new technology is defined and negotiated. No single actor can impose his/her
concept of computer use to the others. For instance, the quick diffusion of micro computers
in American households was mainly caused by the self-augmenting and self-organising
cultural movement of hackers and computer clubs (Allerbeck and Hoag 1989). Neither the
persuasive marketing strategies of the producers nor the political decision to introduce
computer education at schools were responsible for that success. #	

				

		&	 	'()**+, 		
	
The cultural shaping view encompasses two interdependent processes: the public
construction of the sensible uses and rules how and for which sake to use the new
technology, and the private construction of the meanings and styles of a new technical
practice. We have observed the 
 		 of the micro computer as a useful
private gadget in Germany after 1970 in three arenas (see Rammert 1996). Producers and
sellers of computers on the one side and user clubs and consumer organisations on the other
side constituted a 	: They discussed the problems of a fair price and
negotiated about the service and the quality standards. Struggles between the police,
government institutions, and data-bank owners on the one side and hackers and political
groups fighting for the freedom of information or the protection of personal data on the
other side established a 
	. Those engaged negotiated about the definition what
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is a legitimate, what legal, and what is criminal use of computers. In the 	 ,
quite different groups, such as computer artists and marketing people, scientists and
computer clubs, were competing together in creating new applications and cultivating new
styles of computing.
This public construction of a new technology’s meaning and usefulness functions as a
backstage for the 
	 		 of a new technical practice. At first, we have to
realize the difference of 
where computer use is practised. It makes a big difference,
whether an information system is used at work or at home or in public places. In the work
setting, one can expect that the employee has the professional competence to use it and will
follow the use instructions. But particular professional styles and organisational cultures
will also shape the style of computing. In the private setting at home, we will meet a great
variety of skills and interests: systems should therefore be open for creative and
experimental uses and give enough room for emotional needs and amusement (Dholakia
1994). In public places, the system designer has to imagine the "occasional user" (Kubicek
and Taube 1994) with limited skills and a low frustration tolerance. If we look at the new
communication technologies, like the Walkman, the mobile phone and the internet, we can
observe that even the limits between the places are dissolved. Music listening, a private
amusement at home or a collective event in a concert hall, is turned into a very individual
experience and private listening in the public domain when one uses the Walkman (du Guy
1997: 114). If we focus on the new information technologies and the different places where
they are practised, it can be seen that the cultural concepts of the ‘standardized user’ and of
the conventional distinction between private and public worlds are fading now.
Second, the differences between 	   	have to be considered.
Beyond traditional class divisions sociologists observe an "individualization" and
"multiplication" of life styles (Beck 1986). Private users cannot any longer be conceived as
"passive consumers", buying goods driven by nearly the same motives and using the
products in nearly the same manner. In particular the new information technologies which
are open to flexible and creative use require the "active user", who shapes and appropriates
the technical system according to his individual needs and personal style.
The micro computer, for instance, does not move into the household as a fact and
finished good, but it is constructed and configured along sub-cultural images and tastes. As
the computer is eminently suitable as a projection surface, like a Rorschach-test (see Turkle
1982), it would be quite unreasonable to expect the one-dimensional computer user, the
freak with a pale face, or the man with a mechanical character (Weizenbaum 1976; Pflüger
and Schurz 1987). As our deep empirical study of about fifty computer users, (men and
women of all social classes and aged between 18 and 60) demonstrated, one will find
different ways of defining the computer, different styles of using the computer, and
different social and cultural impacts conditioned by these differences of domestic computer
cultivation (Rammert 1996; see also Turkle 1984; Eckert et al. 1991).
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5. Consequences for an Extended Technology Policy: Caring for
Technodiversity and Creating Interactive Networks of Innovation
The cultural shaping view broadens and intensifies the perspective on technological
development. It focuses on the whole process of innovation. It includes both, the early
stages of the inception and generation of new technologies and the later stages of diffusion
and use as well. It analyzes the complex interrelations between all aspects of the innovative
process. That is why more conventional views of technological or economic shaping of
technologies are too crude and restricted to lay the foundations for an extended and
evidence-based innovation policy. Their utility remains limited; insofar as the technological
view succeeds in turning its method from mere technological forecasting into multi-
optional scenario building, and insofar as the economic view is prepared to put more
emphasis on the social embeddedness of technological choices and on the co-evolutionary
character of technical change. Additionally, the cultural shaping view stresses the role of
actors, their practices, and their relations with one another in negotiating arenas. Innovation
is seen as a distributed process of various activities, enacted or mediated by heterogeneous
elements and happening at dispersed places and at different times (see Rammert 1998).
These insights should have consequences for the formulation and practice of technology
policy. An innovation policy based on evidence rather than disciplinary myths needs a high
awareness of these complex interrelationships and a deep understanding of how
technological projects are turned into dominant designs and what is needed to assure and to
shape the innovative process. It can no longer rely on the mere monitoring of technological
trends and policies to strengthen promising paths of development by pushing big projects
and entrenching long-term programmes (see for new concepts Rip, Misa and Shot 1995).
As social shaping research has shown, this technocratic kind of technology policy remains
blind to both social implications and excluded alternatives. It runs the risks of subsiding big
companies, excluding other social actors, and of getting locked-in in an unwanted
technological trajectory. An innovation policy that is informed by cultural shaping research
cannot restrict itself to the economic problems of looking for the one best technological
solution, of searching for the most efficient allocation of resources and for bench-marking
the highest performance. Such a rationalistic view is not based on sound empirical work,
but on formal and normative models. It narrows the political perspective to aspects of
commercial exploitation and best management practices. At the same time, the conditions
of long-term innovativeness may be undermined when the range of possible technology
projects is reduced by strong economic calculations, when the variety of practices and
institutional settings is stream-lined towards a globalized standard model of innovation
management.
The shift from a techno-economic view to an institutionalist-cultural view implies a shift
in technology policy. The fundamental problem of an innovation policy that refers to an
enlarged space of shaping has to cope with the 
- 
  
		 		 	 	 	. Creative diversity refers to three main
sources of innovation:
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• “technological diversity” - the knowledge bases of various scientific and technological
research fields;.
• “actor diversity” - the heterogeneity of innovative actors and the distributedness of the
innovative activities;
• “institutional diversity” - the variety of institutional settings, national regimes and forms
of social embeddedness.
Technology studies have opened the black box of technology. Its students have analyzed
the implicit cultural models of rational man, gender, social inequality or exploitable nature.
By this work of making explicit the tacit dimension of design and the hidden curriculum of
development they are multiplying the paradigms and defining perspectives. These insights
need to be transferred into the cultural arenas where public debates about visions of use and
the value of concepts should be initiated. At this early stage of inception and technology
generation, it is the main task of a sensitive technology policy to open minds to the
multiplicity of perspectives and the variety of possible paths of technological development.
It is not sufficient to do this by the conventional tool of scientific policy consulting; a
democratic and sustainable innovation policy requires the organisation of public discourses
in different arenas in order to mobilize a broad spectrum of ideas and views. After this
period of variety enforcement, a publicly controlled closure process needs to be induced.
Different visions, concepts, and expectations have to be melted into the amalgam of an
enriched cultural model, a kind of leitmotif, that is stable enough to give orientation to
further development and flexible enough to give room for reorientation, if necessary.
This idea is far removed from traditional technology policies to find and fix a putative
“one best way” and to fit a ready-made technology definitely in the existing technical
infrastructure. The new innovation policy acknowledges the paradoxon of opening and
limiting the range of innovation paths. It augments the diversity of knowledge bases and
visions. It initiates discourses and mediates conflicts in public arenas. Thereby a variety of
ideas and distinctive views are linked with one another. As the outcome of these
negotiations, a leitmotif can be finally composed that weaves the different and dispersed
threads of technological development together. Under this semantic aspect, 	
	
		  	 
 	

	 	 
		
			
A second aspect of cultural shaping concerns the process of pragmatic structuring:
Technological development is seen as a distributed process of innovative activities.
Different social actors are involved who follow particular standards of rationality and who
are guided by often opposing interests. Different practices of research scientists, inventors,
entrepreneurs, lawyers, users and political system builders have to be matched with one
another. The key problem is to balance the driving and inhibiting forces in order to smooth
the critical passage points between the different social worlds without sweeping away
productive frictions. Scientific research practices, technological development practices and
economic innovation pratices should be orchestrated in a better way to enhance new
technologies and products, but early patent claims should not inhibit the research process
(as feared in the field of biotechnology). The one-way relation between developer, producer
and user of new technologies should be turned into an interface of recursive innovation.
Time, money, and trust should not be gambled away, as it is done with the traditional
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strategy, initially developing a technology under isolated efficiency and profitability
criteria, and afterwards improving usability, applying attractive design, and caring about the
range of sensible uses. One can imagine a temporal coupling of the technological
engineering and the cultural construction processes, e.g. iterative, evolutionary software
development where time is reserved for learning with users (see Floyd 1987), or the
integration of technology assessment in the early development process, while spaces for
experimentation still exist (Rip and van den Belt 1988; Rammert et al. 1993; Wynne 1995).
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The innovation process is split into many events that take place in different institutional
spheres. In modern societies, the production and distribution of new knowledge has been
mainly organised in the academic and public research system. The utilization of new ideas
has been concentrated in particular public agencies and in the R&D-departments of the
industrial system. The setting of priorities, the allocation of resources, and the regulation of
the whole “national system of innovation” (see Lundvall 1992 and Nelson 1993) have been
the legitimate tasks of the political system. But actually, the established national systems of
innovation that were mainly based on the functional autonomy of institutional spheres and
on the coordination via market or via hierarchy are dissolving. The standard biography of
an innovation that runs from inception to diffusion, stage by stage, is breaking up.
Innovations are shaped at the same time in many different “functional arenas” which are
embedded in national institutional regimes, and loosely connected on a global level by
“idea-innovation-networks” (see Hage and Hollingsworth 2000; Hollingsworth 2000).
On the one side, markets are an efficient mechanism to coordinate heterogeneous and
dispersed activities like those of the innovation process. But they require a certain
accountability. Markets fail when uncertainties grow too high and time horizons expand.
That is why liberal technology policies that favour commercialization and de-regulation
will not be successful in the long run. Though legal and bureaucratic impediments will be
abolished, the gaps between heterogeneous fields and the divide between winners and
losers are widened. On the other side, state and hierarchy are efficient means of
coordination because they can establish accountability and certainty within their own limits.
But bureaucratic organisations fail, when differences should be maintained and the time
horizon should be kept open, as is required for the innovation process. Therefore neo-
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corporatist strategies for technology policy will only show a limited success. It subordinates
heterogeneous forces and fields under common projects, programs, and priorities. This
strong alignment of different visions and innovation cultures risks dampening scientific
creativity and deadening entrepreneurial innovative capacities.
Networks of organisation are a third co-ordination mechanism that avoids some
disadvantages and combines the advantages of the other two. They are based on four
principles: complementarity of resources, mutual adaptation, reciprocity of exchange, and
trust-relations (Powell 1990: 296 pp.). Negotiation maintains the flexibility of markets
without exhibiting the latter’s indifference towards goods and actors. Trust relations reduce
uncertainties without eroding creative differences as radically as organisations do. A
reflexive and sustainable type of innovation policy should be based on a post-
Schumpeterian mode of innovation (Rammert 1998) going beyond focussing only on
markets or hierarchy. It centres around a particular kind of innovation networks, which can
be defined as heterogeneous networks of collective interactive learning. They differ from
the many other networks, eg. the closed personal networks of clans and rotary clubs, the
strategic networks of interorganisational management, or the policy-networks of neo-
corporatist governance (see Freeman 1991 and Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994).
A new innovation policy has to shape an institutional regime that encourages the
creation of such interactive innovation networks in various technological fields and
counteracts strategies whereby one principal agent tries to control and exploit the network
or exclude others from the network. # 
	  		 %  

  			  	 	 	 # 
  
				
	
					
	
 
 	.  				 		
				
			
 		
	 	 	   
	 	  
					
At the end, we can see that the shift of theoretical approaches in science and technology
studies suggests a change of technology policy. We learned from the cultural shaping
approach that technologies are shaped more intensely by the hidden dimensions of practices
and the patterns connecting them together than by explicit technological criteria and
articulated economic choices. This insight should have consequences for the governance
and management of technological development. That does not mean that the established
strategies and tools are always inefficient and should be completely replaced by new ones.
Certainly, it remains important for some kind of traditional technologies and for the later
stages of technological development to formulate explicit goals and to make clear decisions
about priorities and programmes. But it will be more important in the long run to support
spaces where diverse technological development projects and different practices of using
technology may emerge. It will be more favourable for the sake of innovativeness to create
particular arenas of negotiation which give easy access to non-official groups and non-
governmental organisations. These multiple arenas should be turned into public places
where networks of innovation may develop and where different collective actors may learn
and benefit from one another. It will be a prudent policy, if the politicians and
administrators are aware of the productive effects of differing institutional designs and of
different institutional regimes. They should limit their strategies of simplification and
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standardization. If they decide to maintain a certain degree of institutional diversity, the
restrictive effects of bench-marking can be avoided. Institutional diversity can be used to
enforce creative comparisons and to encourage experimental cross-breeding.
Under this perspective of cultivating diversity, the globalization of economic and
technological development and the unification of the European states can be seen as a great
opportunity to benefit from all kinds of diversity. #
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